Islamophobia in the Representations of Islam and Muslims by the British Government between 2001 and 2007*

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Abstract: There is a significant population of Muslims living in Western Europe and also a significant concern that these Muslims are marginalised due to Islamophobia. While the role of sensationalist media and Far Right groups in perpetuating Islamophobia has been widely commented on, not enough attention has been given to the role played by mainstream politicians in fostering Islamophobia. This paper considers how Tony Blair's New Labour government represented Islam and Muslims in speeches given between 2001 and 2007 arguing that the representations were often Islamophobic. Using discourse analysis, the analysis engages with 111 speeches made by these influential ministers. The paper also discusses the discourse surrounding related issues such as multiculturalism, Britishness, integration, and terrorism. It is argued that Islamophobia based on generalisations, assumptions and stereotypes of Islam and Muslims are present in the speeches. Thus, this article calls for an awareness of the way in which mainstream politicians have been involved in stigmatising Islam and Muslims, and perpetuating Islamophobia. This paper contributes to discussions about anti-Muslim prejudice as well as reflecting on the legacy of an important recent political dynasty.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Muslims, Representation, Britain, Politics, Tony Blair

2001-2007 Arasında Britanya Hükümetinin İslam’a ve Müslümanlara İlişkin Temsillerinde İslamofobi


Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamofobi, Müslümanlar, Temsil, Britanya, Siyaset, Tony Blair

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“There is huge and profound ignorance about Islam” (Tony Blair 2007).

Introduction

New Labour emerged victorious in British politics in 1997 with a promise of being more inclusive, more relevant and more engaged with younger generations. There were high hopes of a new era of politics with a young Prime Minister in Tony Blair who offered hope of leading the country into the 21st century. This optimism also existed with regards to race relations, with New Labour overseeing the publication of the Macpherson Report which was frank in admitting the institutional racism that abounded Britain. However, it didn’t take long until questions emerged about their hostile responses to racialised asylum seekers and Northern Asian rioters which, according to Huw Beynon and Lou Kushnick, morphed New Labour’s reign from Cool Britannia to Cruel Britannia (2003). Several commentators started to characterise New Labour as just as ambivalent towards racism as previous governments. James Rhodes (2009) has even gone as far as suggesting that New Labour were instrumental in furthering a ‘colour blind racism’ that hadn’t been seen in Britain before. If this was the case then the victims of this cultural racism were overwhelmingly Muslims who were often imagined in the ‘War on Terror’ as suspicious outcasts. However, there has been inadequate research conducted about the relationship between New Labour’s political manoeuvring and the negative stereotyping of Islam and Muslims. It is for this reason that this paper is concerned with the ways in which Muslims and Islam were conveyed in speeches by British Cabinet ministers of the New Labour Government following 9/11 until the resignation of Tony Blair in 2007. I deconstruct the ways that these concepts and related issues were talked about revealing the connotations, assumptions or inferences concerning Islam and Muslims.

The analysis was done using a discourse analysis approach which seeks a closer reading of a text than would normally be given through paying close attention to the language that is used, the assumptions made, the inferences suggested and also, what is omitted. My approach was based on deconstructing the deployment of language by the ministers to uncover the deeper meanings of their statements. In total, 111 speeches from 16 different Labour Cabinet ministers were analysed. This analysis meant considering the ministers’ statements in a broader context. In order to locate the relevant speeches, various archives including government websites and news portals were searched so that comments made by ministers relating to Islam and Muslims could be located. Once these were collated, they were approached with awareness that language is not a unproblematic mode of communication, but one that can contain multiple facets of information and even trickery. Some of the speeches
were more relevant than others in terms of illuminating how the ministers thought of Islam, Muslims and related topics. Overall, they formed a coherent insight into the trends behind the government understanding of Islam and Muslims. The analysis synthesises these trends and relates them to broader discourses about Islam and Muslims.

Investigating speeches is insightful because these are carefully crafted political statements that explain to listeners how the world should be perceived and what solutions exist. They also usually contain ‘sound bites’ for quick and catchy media reporting. In other words, a lot of thought goes into political speeches with top level politicians often employing a team to help them craft their political pronouncements. This paper specifically focuses on the representations by Government ministers as prejudices are generally assumed to be confined to those with less education than those in the highest echelon of society. However, one commentator has described how “subtle forms [of Islamophobia] amongst the educated and well-placed elite are well-entrenched and proportionately more dangerous. … [as] the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent” (Malik, 2004b, p. 9). Therefore, the potential of Islamophobia existing in these political elites must be treated seriously because they are extremely influential at determining the media headlines and setting national debates, not to mention their major involvement in determining national and local policies and legislation. Cabinet ministers therefore have a huge influence on public opinion and should thus be expected to maintain high standards of honesty and fairness. As will be made clear in this article, such expectations seem to be unfulfilled and more accountability for the statements made by politicians is required.

‘We need to work much harder to integrate Moslems’

If one were to attempt a discourse analysis of the representations of Chinese people, Buddhist people, or any other people except for Muslims in the speeches of the ministers it would be extremely difficult since one would find no ministerial speeches that make reference to these people. That so many speeches involved Muslims and Islam is a telling observation that should not be overlooked. Throughout the ministers’ speeches, Muslims are consistently focused on in a way that other minorities are not. That Muslims are singled out in discussions concerning multiculturalism, integration and other social issues has been recognised in the literature as one way in which Muslims are specifically demonised (Ameli et al., 2007, p. 93; Kundnani, 2007, pp. 6-7, 123; Malik, 2004b, p. xi, Modood, 2007, pp. 4-5). The ministers were aware that Muslims may feel they are being singled out and so tried to counter
this by repeatedly emphasising that they are not seeking to specifically single out Islam or Muslims for negative attention. They sought to prove this by arguing that they have been involved in helping Muslims throughout the world with support and ‘liberation’ in recent years. For example, Margaret Beckett rejected “that the West is conducting a deliberate, co-ordinated attack on Islam both at home and abroad. That is nonsense. Insofar as ‘the West’ is a political entity with any meaning, the evidence shows that it has a powerful record of help and support to Muslims” (Beckett 2006). Another strategy employed by Tony Blair was his rejection of the concepts ‘Islamic terrorist’ and ‘Muslim terrorist’, such as when he said:

I wish to say finally, as I have said many times before, that this is not a war with Islam. It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear Bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion, and the acts of these people are contrary to the teachings of the Koran (Blair 2001c).

Despite attempts not to conflate Muslims with terrorism, there were numerous instances when Blair and other ministers used the terms “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic radicalism”, “Muslim terrorism” and “Muslim fundamentalism”. To add to this, there were occasional reminders that extremists draw upon Islam to justify their actions. For instance, Blair said: “The terrorists base their ideology on religious extremism – and not just any religious extremism, but a specifically Muslim version” (Blair, 2006e) and elsewhere said terrorism “is based on religious extremism. That is the fact. And not any religious extremism; but a specifically Muslim version” (Blair, 2006b). As well as this, the implication that extremism/terrorism is explicitly linked with Islamic teachings was insinuated when the ministers called on Muslims to assist the Government to put an end to extremism/terrorism by condemning and challenging it. So for example, Hazel Blears asked Muslim leaders “to support the police and condemn any terrorist activity” (Blears, 2007b), Ruth Kelly stated that “we ask Muslim leadership organisations to be unequivocal in their rejection of extremism” (Kelly 2007d) and Jack Straw stated that “it should be incumbent on those who profess Islam to challenge the fanatics who cite Islam as a justification for appalling acts of violence” (Straw, 2002). So despite there being instances when ministers rejected that Islam and Muslims were the problem, there were many more obvious examples of them labelling Islam and Muslims as particularly problematic in relation to extremism/terrorism. The ministers’ insistence that Muslim groups and representatives condemn violence seemed to imply that they had thus far supported it or at least remained indifferent.
There were several episodes that occurred during the period under analysis that also led to the ministers singling Muslims out. The most prominent of these was when the Islamic face veil (*niqab*) was targeted, primarily by Jack Straw, as a ‘visible mark of separation and difference’ even though one could also say the same thing about Scottish kilts, Sikh turbans, Jewish kippahs, Japanese kimonos, and Indian saris which probably have as many – if not more – people who wear them in Britain than there are people who wear veils. Another example of a minister specifically demonising Muslims was when Patricia Hewitt accused Muslim GPs of betraying patient confidentiality by speaking to the relatives of ladies who come to discuss private issues with doctors. This becomes even more problematic when it is noted that Hewitt failed to provide any evidence for this accusation. Harriett Harman also singled out Muslims when she pointed out that 60,000 Muslims were not signed up to the electoral register and were therefore undermining democracy. What Harman failed to realise – even though she provided the figures herself in the same speech – is that this equates to only around 3% of Muslims in Britain not being registered on the electoral register. When one considers that around 7% of the overall British population are not registered on the electoral register it suggests that Muslims are ‘participating in democracy’ to a greater extent than the national average, leaving a distinct impression that this is another example of Muslims being targeted for unwarranted criticism. Other general comments that show how Muslims were repeatedly criticised were witnessed when Blair said “[p]eople want to know that the Muslim community in particular, but actually all minority communities, have got the balance right between integration and multiculturalism” (Blair, 2006c), when Kelly said “religious forms of identity are growing - particularly among Muslims …it is hardly surprising that people in some areas feel uncomfortable” (Kelly, 2006d), when Peter Hain said “we need to work much harder to integrate Moslems, in particular, with the rest of society” (Hain, 2002) and when Straw said “[t]he trend towards greater segregation is most marked in some areas with large Asian, principally Muslim, populations” (Straw, 2007b). Throughout the speeches then, in several ways, the ministers expressed the view that Muslims posed numerous problems. It would not be too far-fetched to say that the ministers had an obsession with Muslims and the supposed problems that they caused. To the listening public, an impression of Muslims as a nuisance community who thought they were exempted from behaving sensibly like the rest of us could easily be arrived at. Muslims appear in these government representations as indirectly sympathetic to terrorism, adamant to be different, disrespecting British laws and customs and generally a burden. The whole community is stigmatised as they are consistently singled out for negative attention.
‘There are many different voices within the Muslim community’

A prominent stereotype about Islam and Muslims is that they are static and monolithic, unable to change or accommodate diversity. This stereotype of Muslims as monolithic has been rejected by many who have reminded us of the huge diversity of Muslims around the world, including within Britain. Muslims are of course individuals with unique characteristics and identities, and therefore to assume they are part of one monolithic community just because they are Muslim limits them as individuals. Therefore, Ibrahim Kalin has reminded us that we should “consider the Islamic world not as a monolithic unit but as a diverse, dynamic, and multi-faceted reality” (Kalin, 2004, p. 177). There was a conscious effort by the ministers to show that they recognised Muslims are not one undifferentiated bloc such as when Tony Blair said “Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made up of a rich pattern of diversity” (Blair, 2007), when Jack Straw said “Geographically, Islam is spread across the six continents – and it is equally diverse theologically, socially and politically” (Straw, 2005b) and when Ruth Kelly said “too often in the past, we have failed to see the diversity of opinion in our Muslim communities” (Kelly, 2007b). However, in many instances, the ministers failed to leave behind the assumption of Muslims as monolithic as they repeatedly spoke of “the Muslim community”. Throughout the speeches, the ministers undermined their claim to appreciate the diversity of Muslims and instead totalised all Muslims into one mass. An illuminating example of Blair trying to leave behind the assumptions of Muslims as being monolithic but failing to do so is when he said “we talk about the Muslim community as if there is one Muslim community with one fixed view, and of course there isn’t, there are many different voices within the Muslim community” (Blair, 2006c). Here, Blair is trying to argue Muslims are diverse, but by mentioning ‘the Muslim community’ twice he is contradicting himself by doing exactly what he is trying to criticise. According to Roger Hewitt (2005, pp. 125-126), it is typical of British attitudes towards minorities to totalise them as undifferentiated masses even though British people are usually understood as diverse and complex. The Runnymede Trust (1997) suggested that the foundation of Islamophobia is to imagine Muslims as sealed off from other communities in one unified bloc. Rather than having a nuanced view then, the ministers were complicit in representing Muslims as one mass body without recognising the different Muslim experiences that exist. It is also concerning that the ways in which Muslims were essentialised were often in negative terms as we will come to see in the subsequent sections. For example, there is a widespread stereotype that Islam is innately backward and opposed to anything modern including modernity itself (Ameli et al.,
Although this has been challenged by Islamic scholars, it still appeared throughout the ministers’ speeches as all Muslims were portrayed as needing to “modernise” or adapt to a “modern culture” in a “modern Britain” or “modern world”. For example, Blair encouraged more thinking to be done “about Islam itself and how Islam comes to terms with and is comfortable with the modern world” (Blair, 2006c). This is one example of many that show how the ministers essentialised Muslims as all suffering from the same inadequacies.

‘Moderate Muslims and moderates everywhere’

Although Muslims were frequently treated as one homogeneous group, there were occasions when the ministers engaged in drawing dividing lines amongst 'the Muslim community’. This old imperialist tactic of imposing divisions on others appeared regularly in the speeches as it was extremely common for the Government ministers to talk about “true Muslims” and “real Islam”. They often constructed two categories; ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, the good ones being described as the “moderate” ones and the bad ones as the “extremists”. For instance, Gordon Brown called for "partnership with moderate Muslims and moderates everywhere” (Brown, 2006b). This moderate Islam was said to be characterised by being peaceful, non-violent, tolerant, respectful, and loving – the most oft-mentioned of these being peaceful. So for example, Tony Blair claimed “The doctrine and teachings of Islam are those of peace and harmony. …It is a whole teaching dedicated to building peace in the world” (Blair, 2001a). There has been much debate by commentators about what is meant by ‘moderate’ Islam. Many have understood moderate Islam to be one that is secular and liberal which reinforces the assumption that Islam is inherently contradictory to ‘Western civilisation’ and needs to be diluted in order to be compatible (Abou El Fadl, 2007, pp. 106-107; Ramadan, 1999, p. 197; Waardenburg, 2003, p. vi).

Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan has revealed the assumptions that lie behind calling for ‘moderation’ as follows:

There has been much talk of promoting ‘moderate’ Muslim belief. ‘Moderate’ is an ambiguous term. It hardly seems appropriate at this time to contemplate a wavering or uncertain approach in promoting centrist Islamic principles – such as human dignity, respect for life, justice, and generosity – as part of a wider humanitarian effort. On the contrary, such a humanitarian effort must be undertaken with vigor and certainty. We do not strive for just a moderate belief in human rights or a moderate desire for peace (Bin Talal, 2004, pp. 4-5).
Moderate Islam is often expected to be more personal and private to the extent where any Muslim who allows their Islamic beliefs to influence their political activity in the public sphere is considered extreme. The rise of the word ‘Islamist’ in recent years as someone who allows Islam to shape their politics has thus been given negative connotations. Therefore, it appears that Muslims are expected to consider their religion as “of a secondary nature and pertain to their private life which means hidden, invisible, almost non-existent. … In short, the Muslims should be Muslims without Islam” (Ramadan, 1999, p. 184). It is hypothesised by some that these constructions of Islam are to serve political purposes, mainly in making Islam more passive by weakening the ideological resistance that Islam can muster by emphasising Islam’s spiritual dimension and reducing its political and social justice dimensions (Ameli et al., 2007, p. 24; Waardenburg, 2003, p. 361). It has been argued that the brand of Islam that best matches the Government’s desires is Sufism which is often presented as the most secular, spiritual and passive form of Islam (Cesari, 2004, pp. 50-51; Geaves, 2004, p. 67). Ruth Kelly expressed the Government’s desire to work specifically with Sufis by saying “We need to always ask ourselves whether we are working with the right groups in the right way. Organisations such as the Sufi Muslim Council are an important part of that work” (Kelly, 2006a). So when the Muslim Council of Britain criticised the ‘War on Terror’, “[t]he State looked instead to the Sufi Muslim Council as a replacement, not because it represented the majority sect among British Muslims, but because it was perceived as supportive of the government’s foreign policy” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 182).

In discussing ‘the real Muslims’ and ‘the true Islam’, extremists/terrorists were said to be abusing Islam and twisting its ‘real’ teachings as a way of justifying their political grievances. For example, Blair said that “the extremists that threaten violence are not true Muslims in the sense of being true to the proper teaching of Islam” (Blair, 2006d). Elsewhere, David Blunkett said “We tackle those who distort and destroy the name of Islam by using terrorism in a way that was never authorised by the Koran” (Blunkett, 2003). The ministers further differentiated between the two types of Muslims by occasionally declaring that Muslims have contributed a great deal to British society and that the majority are ‘integrated’, ‘decent’ and ‘law-abiding’. Overall, the ministers were active in encouraging non-Muslims and Muslims to imagine good and bad Muslims. They repeatedly called on ‘moderate’ Muslims to outcast and isolate those non-conformist Muslims they consider extreme. For example, Brown said “we must take steps to isolate extremists from the moderate majority” (Brown 2006b), and despite saying “extremists are explicitly and continuously trying to divide and rule, to drive wedges between
nations and between peoples” (Beckett, 2006), Margaret Beckett still pushed to “mobilise the vast moderate, majority and push the extremists to the fringe where they belong” (Beckett, 2006). The ministers also reminded Muslims that often Muslims themselves are amongst the victims of terrorist attacks. What is perhaps most interesting about the categories that were developed is the ambiguity surrounding them. Rarely were explanations given as to what is moderate and what is extreme meaning that it was up to the audience to decipher who the good and bad Muslims were. Since no quantifying that instructed listeners as to the proportions of extremist Muslims that exist, one may conclude that there are large numbers of extremists amongst Muslim community, or even that the majority of Muslims are extremists.

The ministers did not hide the fact that they were promoting specific types of Islam. They openly funded and worked with specifically hand-picked Muslim scholars and Muslims organisations to promote a certain version of Islam as well as encouraged mosques to engage in certain activities and gave specific syllabi to Islamic schools for them to teach. For example, Hazel Blears explained how the Government “is working with a group of Muslim organisations to assist the running of an International Roadshow of Islamic Scholars which brings Islamic scholars to the UK to expose young Muslims to alternative international Islamic schools of thought” (Blears, 2006). Blair also admitted that “one of the things that we are looking at is how you make sure that there is a certain set of agreed rules and guidelines as to how any faith school should teach its own faith” (Blair, 2005b) and elsewhere confessed that he has used certain Muslims to promote a specific version of Islam:

I am probably not the person to go into the Muslim community and persuade them that this extreme view of Islam is completely mistaken and completely contrary to the proper tenets of the religion of Islam. It is better that you mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this (Blair, 2006a).

This process of interference by the Government in the teaching of Islam has been described by Tariq Modood as “the State imposing upon Muslims its own template, plans, modes of partnership and chosen imams and leaders” (Modood, 2007, p. 81). This Government interference has been criticised by some who believe it leads to Muslims feeling their religion is being interfered with and distorted by outsiders thus giving more legitimacy to those who advocate extreme interpretations of Islam as being the only alternative (Lumbard, 2004, p. xvii, 66; Malik, 2006, p. 22). This process seems to already be underway as it has been noted that being considered as a ‘moderate Muslim’ is almost seen as being a traitor who does not practice Islam properly. Yet, the central point in this section is not about whether Islam is ‘a religion
of peace’ or not, or about arguing that a version of Islam should be promoted. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that the Government considers itself to have authority in intervening with theological matters by claiming who is a ‘true Muslim’ and what the ‘real Islam’ is – both of which are practices that many Muslims would be apprehensive to engage in themselves. In this sense then, one might describe the ministers as engaging in Orientalism since “[t]he Orientalist, then, sees his [sic] task as expressing the dislocation and consequently speaking the truth about Islam” (Said, 1978, p. 281). Despite her involvement in defining a ‘real Islam’ and the ‘true Muslims’, Ruth Kelly understood this point well when she said “Government cannot intervene in theological debates - that is for faith groups themselves” (Kelly, 2007d). The ministers not only saw themselves as authorities on Islamic scholarship but wandered into the territory of imposing ideological narratives on Muslims citizens by demanding that they conform to State-sanctioned interpretations of Islam. This may sound more authoritarian that people in Britain are used to but indeed formed part of New Labour policy.

‘The lack of precision of what it means to us to be British’

In a great number of the speeches, issues of national identity were raised. Indeed, it has been recognised that “since Blair became leader of the Labour Party and even more since he became Prime Minister, notions of national identity have been a core part of the New Labour project” (Dodd, 2002, p. 3). This has been elaborated on by Ian Bradley who has explained:

Notions of national identity have been a key part of Tony Blair’s New Labour project since its inception. Among his first priorities on becoming Prime Minister in 1997 was a personal crusade to re-brand Britain as a new, modern, forward-looking and self-consciously young country… [There has been a] carefully thought out and historically rooted attempt to define and promote British identity in the interests of social cohesion (Bradley, 2007, p. 6).

In the speeches it was argued that patriotism towards Britain needed to be increased by emphasising Britishness and British values. However, before this could be called for, it was recognised that Britishness and British values are not well defined and need to be clarified. Jack Straw even went as far as suggesting that there is “a crisis of identity …and it shows in the lack of precision of what it means to us to be British” (Straw, 2007a; Straw, 2007b). This ‘crisis of British identity’ may be because the UK is a collective of four countries (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), and also because of the mass-immigration after Empire. The solution to this problem according to Alan Johnson was that “there should be a national ‘Who we think we
are’ week” (Johnson, 2007) while Straw pushed for the development of ‘a British story’ that would provide Britons with a greater understanding of the nation’s history (Straw, 2007a; Straw, 2007b). Despite the admittance that it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to define unique British values, this did not stop the ministers from providing their version of “the British way of life” and “core British values”. According to the ministers, the values they cited as best describing Britain as a nation were justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty. This process of declaring national values has been criticised by those who argue that values are not something that can be packaged, but which organically grow out of communities so that values will always be contested and changing (Kundnani, 2007, s. 136; Mason, 2000, p. 2; Modood, 2007, pp. 152-153; Winder, 2005, p. 1, 463).

These discussions about Britishness are relevant to the representation of Islam and Muslims because they were often held in relation to discussions about Muslims. More specifically, the ministers seemed to construct ideas of Britishness as something opposite to what it meant to be Muslim. In order to understand this further it is important to recognise that perceiving an ‘out-group’ as ‘Other’ is a basic psychological device used to construct an identity. Maria Root argues that “[d]efining self in relation to the ‘Other’ seems to be a basic human pattern. …human nature leads us not only to observe the other, but to define ourselves in contrast to the other” (Root, 2000, p. 206). This manifests in discussions based on an ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction where ‘they’ are presented in a negative light and ‘we’ are presented positively so that ‘we’ are superior to ‘them’. So for example, Edward Said has argued:

[T]he development and maintenance of every culture require [sic] the existence of another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity – for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction – involves stabilising opposites and ‘Others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’ (Said, 1978, p. 332).

It’s been argued with great tenacity that historically, Muslims and Islam have always been perceived as the ‘Other’ of Europeans, meaning that British – and generally European – identities have often been understood as everything that Muslims are not (Ameli et al., 2007, p. 26; Kalin, 2004, p. 163, 166; Lockman, 2004, pp. 36-37; Sajid, 2006, p. 7; Walker, 2005, p. 26, 85). Throughout history then, “Islam helped Britain, and especially England, in defining her own identity through a multidimensional relationship” (Malik, 2004b, p. 79). After understanding that identity is constructed in relation to ‘the Other’ then, it is interesting to note how the values defined as being
central to Britishness (justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty) are all ones which commentators have identified as commonly perceived as absent in Islam (Abou El Fadl, 2002, p. 3, Ansari, 2004, p. 35; Himmat, 2004, p. 85; Kalin, 2004, p. 171, 173; Kundnani, 2007, p. 126). This fits with the idea that there is a conflict between Islamic values and British values that cannot be reconciled, and that the presence of Muslims in Europe is actually threatening these values. For example, Melanie Phillips, Columnist for the *Daily Mail*, claims Muslims need to “reconcile their faith and culture with mainstream British values” (Phillips 2007: 280) and Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington claims Muslims are guilty of maintaining their values which contradict with ‘Western’ ideals:

> Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe (Huntington, 1997, pp. 304-305).

In the speeches, the Government ministers seemed to dispute these views by explicitly denying that Islamic values and British values contradict each another. So for example, Ruth Kelly claimed that “Islamic values and core citizenship values are not in conflict” (Kelly, 2007d) and that the ‘core British values’ can be “found in Islam as much as in Christian, Sikh, Hindu, Jewish and other traditions” (Kelly, 2006c). This was complimented by John Reid who said ‘core British values’ “are enshrined in the British way of life, but many of them are also in the Qur’an” (Reid 2006a). Arguing that the ‘core British values’ were compatible with Islam was also achieved by frequently emphasising that the values are “common values”, “global values”, “universal values” and “shared values”. The notion that the ‘core British values’ are universally held is not only contradictory (since they cannot be adopted by everyone at the same time as being unique to British national identity), but throughout the speeches was also undermined by a constant focus on the duty of Muslims to learn and then abide by the ‘core British values’. For example, Tony Blair, speaking in the context of Muslims living in Britain, warned that Muslims must adopt ‘core British values’:

> We expect all our citizens to conform to [“our common values”]. Obedience to the rule of law, to democratic decision-making about who governs us, to freedom from violence and discrimination are not optional for British citizens. They are what being British is about. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice (Blair, 2006d).
Furthermore, Hazel Blears said that “we respect religious differences, but are united in a transcendant [sic] belief in democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Blears, 2007a) thus implying that some religious differences (she was talking in the context of Islam as well) are opposed to such values. That Islamic values and British values are compatible was further undermined by the repeated mention of the values of justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty being part of “our way of life” and “our values” as if Britain has ownership over them. A specific example of Muslims being expected to adopt values that are seen as alien to was expressed by Kelly, who claimed “making [core British values] resonate with some people, including a small group of younger Muslims, is a genuine challenge” (Kelly, 2007c), and therefore suggested that Muslim children needed to be taught “about how to live out the values of justice, peace and respect both as a person of faith and as a citizen” (Kelly, 2007d). Following this, she launched a project which “encourages young British Muslims to identify and live by the shared British values of justice, peace and respect” (Kelly, 2007e). Here is another example of the ministers demonstrating their belief that British values need to be dictated to Muslims, a moral high ground reminiscent of the white man’s burden.

It was often stated in the speeches that the ‘core British values’ are “non-negotiable”. Arun Kundnani of the Institute of Race Relations understood this as a way of saying that Muslims have nothing to contribute in the search for noble values (Kundnani, 2007, p. 137), but it may also be read as suggesting that Muslims are uncomfortable with adopting values such as justice, democracy and fairness and therefore want to question them. This may also be why the ministers seemed to stand against ‘political correctness’ on numerous occasions with repeated references about the need for “open”, “honest”, “frank”, “sensible”, “mature”, “proper”, “reasoned”, “calm” and “direct” discussions about issues relating to Muslims and Islam using “common sense”. Blair was so adamant to make this point that he repeated it several times in one speech:

[T]here is a debate that we need to have [concerning the veil]. …There is a whole question to do with integration, and my view is that we try and deal with this debate sensitively, but we have to deal with the debate. …Now we need to conduct this debate in a sensitive way, but it needs to be conducted. …I think we need a way of having this debate because I am sure it is there, …so we need to have it and we can have it I think in a sensitive way …we need to have that debate in a sensible and serious way. And even though probably most people wouldn’t have chosen that the debate started in this way, it is under way so we should engage in it. …you have got to have an honest debate about it. …So look it is a very, very sensitive issue. All I am saying is we need to have this debate about integration (Blair, 2006c).
Remarks about the necessity of having an open debate and not being shy to discuss any issues suggest that the stereotype of Muslims being reluctant or even unable to engage in rational discussions was assumed by the ministers.

As shown then, despite the Government ministers claiming the ‘core British values’ are compatible with Islam, there were assumptions about Muslims needing to be told to adopt them, which suggests that Islam does not have any scope for values such as tolerance, the rule or law and equality, and that Muslims reject them. The idea that Islamic values contradict with the values of justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty has been denied by many who argue that in fact, all of these values can easily be derived from Islamic scriptures as most of them are fundamental Islamic principles (Abou El Fadl, 2002, pp. 14-15, 99; Abou El Fadl, 2004; Abou El Fadl, 2007, p. 183, 208; Bin Talal, 2004, p. 33, 37; Voll, 2003, p. 125). So for example, some have highlighted that when Muslims ruled over non-Muslims historically, the Muslims were extremely tolerant in the way they treated non-Muslims by allowing them to continue practicing their religion and supporting their existence (Hoyland, 2004, p. xiv; Karabell, 2007; Nasr, 2003, pp. 35-36). For this reason, the Islamic empire has been described as “one of the most tolerant empires in history” (Abukhattala, 2004, p. 168). Moreover, with regards to abiding by the rule of law, it is argued that when Europeans visited the Ottoman Empire, they were shocked at how law-abiding the people were and how peaceful it was due to the great respect for the law (Lewis, 1994, p. 8; Van de Weyer, 2001, p. 10). Furthermore, it should be recognised that Islamic scholars have placed a huge emphasis on Muslims abiding by the rule of law in non-Muslim countries, as has been explained by Mathias Rohe, a Judge at the Court of Appeal in Nuremberg:

In 1997 the European Council for Expert Opinions and Studies emphasized that those Muslims who live in non-Islamic countries are obliged to regard the person, the reputation and the assets of non-Muslims as inviolable in return for the right of residence in the country concerned. …Thus, if a Muslim feels bound by the Sharī’a he/she must by that token follow the laws of the country where he/she is staying (Rohe, 2004, p. 170).

After realising how important the values described as ‘core British values’ are to Muslims, Ian Bradley has argued that Muslims actually embody ‘core British values’ more than ‘indigenous’ Britons do (Bradley, 2007, p. 15, 174, 199). Others who have studied history have even gone as far to question the accuracy of claiming that the values of justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness, democracy, and freedom/liberty actually reflect what it means to be British because there have been many instances when Britain was involved with contradicting these values, whether in the form of the Crusades, slavery, colonialism neo-imperialism, or
the ‘War on Terror’, suggesting that the history of Muslims has been based on these supposedly ‘core British values’ much more than the history of Britons or even Christians has (Abukhattala, 2004, p. 168; Jenkins, 2000, pp. 14-15, 43, 137-138; Kundnani, 2007, pp. 177-179; Modood, 2007, p. 5; Said & Sharify-Funk, 2003, p. 23; Shah-Kazemi, 2004, p. 127). This has been understood by Paul Gilroy who has wrote: “In Britain, our sternest leaders have comforted us with a new rule that any new arrivals will henceforth be expected to learn and to adhere to traditional norms and values even though they may not be widely practiced in the country at large” (Gilroy, 2004, p. 28).

Even in the speeches, it was apparent that one of the most – if not the most – mentioned ‘core British values’; tolerance, is significantly compromised. One would think that if this was a fundamental characteristic of the British nation that even the intolerable would be tolerated. However, there are arguable plenty of instances of intolerant statements made in the ministers’ speeches. For example, Charles Clarke explains that “Individuals who seek to create fear, distrust and division in order to stir up terrorist activity will not be tolerated” (Clarke 2005a) and Blair has also said extremism is something Britain “simply cannot tolerate” (Blair, 2001b). This occurs even though Blair claimed his Government would “confront their [Al Qaeda’s] philosophy of hate with our own of tolerance and freedom” (Blair, 2003b) and that “by and large Britain knows it is a tolerant and good natured nation, it’s rather proud of it, and it’s responded to this terrorism with tolerance” (Blair, 2005b). The point here is not to argue about whether extremists should be tolerated or not, but to suggest that it is misleading for the ministers to declare tolerance as the fundamental value on which the British nation is based by saying such thing as “the Union [Jack] flag by definition is a flag for tolerance” (Brown, 2006a) and that “Britain’s traditions of tolerance are robust” (Kelly, 2007b), since they quite quickly find a limit to their tolerance. The contradiction of claiming to be tolerant but acting intolerant can be best seen in Straw’s comments when he claimed “[w]e live in a country which is tolerant …And we will not tolerate those who use violence to attack these freedoms and values which we all hold dear” (Straw 2005a) or in Blair’s statement when he said “Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here” (Blair, 2006d). Indeed, as a result of this, some have suggested the real question is not whether Muslims can learn to be tolerant but whether Britain can find the courage to tolerate Muslims (Abou El Fadl, 2002, p. 96; Mahmood, 2004, pp. 74-75; Moussalli, 2003, p. 154).

‘The sworn enemies of everything the civilised world stands for’

As was demonstrated in the previous section, the Government ministers repeatedly insinuated that Muslims are alien to Britain. In other instances
the ministers were even more bombastic in suggesting that there was a clash of civilisations between an enlightened West and a barbaric East. They did this despite claiming that it was Muslim extremists that advocate the idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’ in order to divide people. For example, Margaret Beckett admitted that “[i]t’s all to [sic] easy to buy into the terrorist rhetoric of a great clash of civilisations” (Beckett, 2006). In fact, the ministers themselves seemed to buy into that rhetoric in their speeches. As in the previous examples, despite claiming one position, they showcased another, contradictory one. For instance, they accepted that there are distinct ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ civilisations, as was evidenced in their numerous references to “the Muslim world” and “the Islamic world”, in distinction from “the West” and “the Western world”. This construction has been criticised by Christopher Stonebanks who has argued that “creating this belief that there actually is an ‘[Islamic] world’, perhaps floating around somewhere between Venus and Jupiter [is the best way] to dehumanize a culture and a people [since it] creates a world for them, apart from our own Western world” (Stonebanks, 2004, p. 91). The ministers further reinforced the idea of a clash of civilisations by using personal pronouns such as ‘us’ and ‘we’ when talking about Britain and ‘they’ and ‘them’ when talking about Muslims, even if they were talking about British Muslims. For example, in a response to the Muslim riots in 2001, David Blunkett said “[t]hese maniacs [the Muslim rioters in 2001] actually burned down their own businesses, their own job opportunities. They discouraged investment in their areas” (Blunkett, 2002a). Other examples could be seen when Tony Blair said “We wanted to be hospitable to new groups. We wanted, rightly, to extend a welcome and did so by offering public money to entrench their cultural presence” (Blair 2006d), when he talks about “the relationship between our society and how the Muslim community integrates with our society” (Blair, 2006c) and when Jack Straw said “Christ is one of their prophets as well of one of ours” (Straw, 2006b). Muslims are treated less as British citizens and more as members of an alien civilisation, one which often was portrayed as totally different at best, and threatening at worse. 

A ‘clash of civilisations’ was also suggested when the ministers repeatedly said that the terrorists and extremists are attacking the “civilised” people and nations of the world. So for example, 9/11 was said to have “represented an attack on all the civilised values of the world” (Blair, 2001d) and Al Qaeda were described as “the sworn enemies of everything the civilised world stands for” (Blair, 2001e). Moreover, it was telling when Blair described Saudi Arabia, a Muslim country, as “a good and dependable friend to the civilised world” (Blair, 2001e) because according to this statement, this Muslim country is only a ‘friend to the civilised world’, but not part of it. Perhaps one of the
clearest examples of a minister implying that there is a ‘clash of civilisations’ was Blair’s description of ‘the East’:

...In another part of the globe, there is shadow and darkness where not all the world is free, where many millions suffer under brutal dictatorship; where a third of our planet lives in a poverty beyond anything even the poorest in our societies can imagine; and where a fanatical strain of religious extremism has arisen (Blair, 2003a).

The assumption that there is a ‘clash of civilisations’ culminated in the idea that there is an ideological ‘battle for global values’ where Britain and the rest of the ‘civilised’ countries need to prove that their values are superior since the terrorists and extremists want to attack these values. So for example, Blair stated that “[w]e will show by our spirit and dignity and by a quiet and true strength that there is in the British people, that our values will long outlast theirs” (Blair, 2005a). This fight over values was often described as “a battle for hearts and minds”. Blair has described this overall process as follows:

...[I]t is a global fight about global values; it is about modernisation, within Islam and outside of it; it is about whether our value system can be shown to be sufficiently robust, true, principled and appealing that it beats theirs. …This is not just about security or military tactics. It is about hearts and minds about inspiring people, persuading them, showing them what our values at their best stand for (Blair, 2006b).

Despite rejecting the idea that there is a ‘clash of civilisations’ then, this paradigm was still ever-present within the speeches. Muslims were understood to lack British values in the previous section, and in this section it is shown how the ministers even seemed to go further in constructing Muslims as belonging to an entirely different civilisation who are inferior and only potential allies rather than natural ones. The ministers seemed to casually accept the widespread perception that Islam is a foreign religion that belongs ‘over there’ and not ‘here’ (Ameli et al., 2007, p. 33; Kalin, 2004, p. 173; Modood, 2007, pp. 150-151; Poole, 2002, p. 250; Ramadan, 1999, p. 1, 216-217; Said, 1978, p. xv; Waardenburg, 2003, p. 326, 350, 359). This is despite the fact that there have been millions of Muslims living as law-abiding citizens within ‘Western’ countries for generations (Al Sayyad, 2002, p. 10; Malik, 2004b, p. 104; Ramadan, 1999, p. 217; The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 31). For the ministers though, there was ample evidence to suggest they understood Muslims as foreigners or outsiders who had to adapt to British society and not bring their ‘baggage’ with them. That is why Tony Blair said that immigrants “can’t come here and start inciting our young people in our communities to take up violence against British people here, and if they do that, they’re going to go back” (Blair, 2005b) and in another instance said “[o]
ur tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here. We don’t want the hate-mongers, whatever their race, religion or creed” (Blair, 2006d). This kind of nationalist sentiment seems to suggest problems originate from outside of our borders and can contaminate us if we are infiltrated. The threatening civilisation in the ministers’ speeches was not Communists, was not the Chinese, was not Latin America, or any other supposed civilisation, but was Muslims.

‘It’s in our communities and we’ve got to root it out’

The ideas in the speeches that have already been explained in the previous two sections, such as the idea that Muslims need to adopt British values and that Muslims belong to a different civilisation, underpin a broader claim that can be deciphered from the speeches, which is that Muslims are a threat to Britain. The ministers repeatedly suggested that Britain was a victim that was under threat. This involved positive self-presentation that suggested the Government only acts in self-defence toprovocation rather than initiating any aggression themselves. This was exemplified in Tony Blair’s comment that “the al-Qaeda network threatens Europe, including Britain …[s]o we have a direct interest in acting in our self-defence to protect British lives” (Blair, 2001c). These ‘new threats’ were made even more threatening by the assertion that they are going to last for many years to come. All of this discourse about a ‘new and unprecedented threat’ was summed up well by Ruth Kelly, who explained extremism as “a complex and deadly threat …It will be a major challenge to our security for a generation to come. And it is growing. …It is also a new kind of threat” (Kelly, 2007d). This accusation becomes more meaningful when it is recognised that Muslims throughout history have more often than not been portrayed as ‘an invading threat’ to Europe (Clifford, 2006, p. 11; Kundnani, 2007, p. 11; Phillips, 2007, p. 47, 285; Poole, 2000, p. 158, 162; Ramadan, 2001, p. 264; Said, 1997, p. 144; Waardenburg, 2003, p. 30). The ministers were vague enough when discussing the threat that it was not clear that it was a tiny minority of Muslims who’ve adopted political extremism that may engage in terrorism. Rather, they implied that Muslims as a collective monolithic mass were a potential threat, adding to the already existing hysteria around terrorism that the news media relishes in. The fear generated by all these claims that Britain faces a “new age of insecurity and uncertainty” (Reid, 2006b) has led to the abuse of Muslims’ human rights since every Muslim has become a potential extremist (Allen, 2003, p. 9; Ameli et al., 2007, pp. 29-30; Cesari, 2004, p. 35; EUMC, 2006, p. 6; Kundnani, 2007, p. 8, 128; Malik, 2004b, p. 182; Modood, 2007, pp. 4-5). This suspicion is worsened by those who propose that “evidence suggests
that the numbers [of British Muslims] who do support either the aims or the tactics of the jihad are terrifying” (Phillips, 2007, p. 9) or those who say extremists “are ahead of us, behind us, and within us” (Blankley, 2005, pp. 28-29). Thus, the whole Muslim community is stigmatised which also occurred in the speeches through comments such as Gordon Brown’s when he said there are al-Qaeda “imitators in the heart of our [Muslim] communities” (Brown, 2006b), when Blair said “I’m sorry, there’s no point in us kidding ourselves about the nature of this problem. It’s there, it’s in our communities and we’ve got to root it out” (Blair, 2005b) and when Charles Clarke said extremists can be found in “training camps, in prisons, in bookshops, or in places of worship” (Clarke, 2005b). Due to this general suspicion of all Muslims, Hazel Blears openly admitted “that some of our counter-terrorism powers will be disproportionately experienced by the Muslim community” (Blears, 2005). After reading this comment by Blears it is now understandable why elsewhere she said “I understand sometimes that people in Muslim communities feel they are under the spotlight” (Blears, 2007b). Moreover, when speaking to a Muslim audience, John Reid also admitted that “I understand the frustrations that because of [the ‘War on Terror’], that you have become more of a focus in that struggle against terrorism” (Reid, 2006a). The ministers were thus unapologetic in admitting the pressures that Muslims should expect to encounter under the New Labour government.

There are numerous commentators who have discussed how the ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in the loss of many civil liberties for Muslims who have been viewed as an ‘enemy-within’ (Abbas, 2006, p. xv, Ansari, 2002, p. 4; Choudhury, 2005, pp. 19-20; Fekete, 2006, p. 36, 39; Malik, 2004b, p. 99). For example, Nadeem Malik, a Muslim Solicitor, recently reviewed several key pieces of legal legislation in Britain, coming to the conclusion that “when considering even fleetingly a few recent legislative developments, that British Muslims are not being given the same rights and freedoms that others enjoy” (Malik, 2004a, p. 66). The response by the ministers to these types of accusations was either to dismiss them by claiming “Muslims in the UK enjoy the same rights and legal protection from abuses that all other citizens do” (Blears, 2006) or to claim that they are necessary as the need to maintain security takes priority. This latter justification was demonstrated when Blair claimed “[w]e must take every measure to protect ourselves against [the threat of terrorism]” (Blair, 2004), when Brown said “we will take any necessary steps …[to ensure] there is no safe haven for terrorists and no hiding place for terrorist finance” (Brown, 2006c), and when Charles Clarke said “it is right that the Government and law enforcement agencies do everything possible to counter it [terrorism]” (Clarke, 2005a). At this point one may take a moment
to admire the foresight that Andrea Lueg had when she wrote in 1995 that “the imagined Islamic threat could in the future be more effectively exploited by internal politics than it has ever been before” (Lueg, 1995, p. 28).

Another way in which Muslims were treated with suspicion was through the frequent demands that Muslim preachers must obey British laws. For instance, the ministers mentioned that foreign Muslim preachers should be vetted to ensure they are not promoting extremism, and to ensure they have sufficient levels of English and knowledge of British society before coming to Britain. For example, David Blunkett announced that “the Home Office will be introducing a number of measures to ensure overseas ministers of religion coming to the UK have the skills needed for ministry in a diverse and cohesive society” (Blunkett, 2004). Blair even went as far as suggesting that “[i]t would be preferable for British preachers to come out of the [Muslim] community [in Britain] rather than come in from abroad” (Blair, 2006d). This preference of Muslims from Britain as opposed to Muslims from outside is also related to positive self-identification as it implies that British society is not capable of producing terrorists. Thus, when it was discovered that the 7/7 bombers were all British-born-and-raised, it “completely bamboozled the intelligence services, who were of the view that any would-be terrorist attacks would be organised by overseas groups infiltrating networks in Britain” (Abbas, 2006, p. xvi). Confusion and surprise over this was also expressed by the ministers. However, rather than accept that extremism/terrorism does not just only originate ‘over there’, Margaret Beckett provided an alternative reason, by explaining that extremism “is a cult that sells such a vision to impressionable young men and women. That is how it is able to persuade a young Briton, born into our tolerant, democratic society to blow himself up” (Beckett, 2006). In these instances when it is foreign Muslims that pose the highest threat, Islamophobia merges with xenophobia.

‘There are many young people in Muslim communities’

As explained in the previous section, it was often implied that Muslims in Britain are a threat to the nation, and in an earlier section it was also highlighted that Muslims are even a threat to British values. In other instances it was common for the ministers to describe Muslims as ‘vulnerable’, ‘disaffected’, ‘disillusioned’, ‘alienated’ and ‘susceptible to indoctrination, radicalisation and brainwashing’. For example, Ruth Kelly talked about extremists who “seek to groom the disaffected and vulnerable [using] techniques to turn young people into tools for extremist violence” (Kelly, 2007d) and John Reid warned Muslim parents that “there are fanatics who are looking to groom and brainwash children in these communities, including your children”
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(Reid, 2006a). This portrayal suggests Muslims lack the critical thinking skills to evaluate extremist ideology and make an informed judgement about its content. This dovetails with a common representation of Muslims, and minorities in general, who may be viewed as lacking agency and simply being a product of their culture (Baumann, 1998, p. 1; The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 5, 7). This has been rejected as it is argued that “Muslim communities in Britain and Western Europe are not mere mute spectators on the sidelines but constitute active constellations negotiating several strategies of cooption and resistance” (Malik, 2004b, p. 97). It was often ‘young Muslims’ who were specifically patronised – as can be seen in the above comments by Kelly and Reid – who were consistently demonised as they were considered the most susceptible to extremists influences and a key group that needed to be worked with. For example, Kelly asked “are we doing enough to reach those most at risk from extremist messages - particularly disaffected young men?” (Kelly, 2007c). Hazel Blears answered that by saying “it’s really important to reach out to young people - and there are many young people in Muslim communities” (Blears, 2007b). Commentators have already highlighted that young Muslim men are often affected most aggressively by suspicious Islamophobia, which is why “it is bearded young Muslim men that are likely to be stopped and searched by the police and experience arbitrary arrest” (Modood, 2007, p. 61). Peter Mandaville has dismissed the accusations that Muslim youth are weak-minded by arguing that they are adept at constructing their creative, complex and fluid identities by drawing upon aspects of their religion (Mandaville, 2002, pp. 219-220). Therefore, he concludes, one should not ignore “the complicated and creative richness of the contemporary Muslim youth culture in Europe” (Mandaville, 2002, p. 220). The ministers however, were guilty of demonising Muslim youth as a group that the rest of society should have concern about. The stigmatisation of young Muslims has recently also been apparent in debates about universities being ‘hotbeds of extremism’ (Abbas, 2006, pp. xvi-xvii; Phillips, 2007, p. 149), but the major way it materialised in the speeches was through the suspicion of madrassahs (Islamic schools), which were perceived as places where extremism could be infused into young people, and therefore key sites which the Government planned to intervene in by closing the ones deemed extreme and proscribing a standard curriculum for the rest. This is reminiscent of Britain’s colonial era in India, when the British authorities established their own madrassahs to ensure Muslims were being educated ‘the correct’ way (Seddon, 2004, p. 24). Here is another example of non-Muslim ministers dictating to Muslims what they can and cannot believe in as if they are undertaking imperialism at home once again.
‘The veil is an obstacle to women’s participation’

One of the most predominant stereotypes about Islam and Muslims is that they are extremely patriarchal and oppressive of females (Abou El Fadl, 2007, p. 250; Kalin, 2004, p. 173, 18-20; Malik, 2004b, p. 102; Poole, 2000, p. 158; Ramadan, 1999, pp. 113-114; The Runnymede Trust, 1997, pp. 28-29; Waardenburg, 2003, p. 28). This view has been challenged by numerous scholars who, whilst recognising that some Muslim women – like women in all societies and cultures – are exploited and subjugated, identify that not only does Islam provide the potential resources for an interpretation that values women, but also that many Muslim women are both assertive in how they engage with Islam (Abou El Fadl, 2007, pp. 262-264; Abukhattala, 2004, pp. 161-163; Jawad, 2003, pp. 9-11; Kundnani, 2007, p. 138, Lueg, 1995, pp. 22-23; Malik, 2004b, pp. 86-87, 105; Werbner, 2002, pp. 263-264). Loubna Skalli (2004) has explained how Muslim women have been considered by ‘Westerners’ as victims of their Islamic heritage without even being consulted first. She explains that some believe Muslim women are in need of liberation from ‘the West’, to the extent where they have become the site where the battle between ‘East’ and ‘West’ is played out, by Muslims who try to ensure Muslim women abide by Islamic traditions, and by ‘Westerners’ who try to ‘modernise’ them in order to provide, what she calls, ‘pseudo-liberation’. Skalli goes on to explains how this operated in colonial times:

The colonial regimes revealed an exaggerated interest in the life and conditions of Muslim women. They professed to educate them and liberate them from the oppressive yokes of their religion and men. The colonialist logic attributed the backwardness of Muslim societies and the inferiority of their cultures particularly to two main observed practices: veiling and seclusion of women. These became the emblem of both women’s oppression and their culture’s backwardness (Skalli, 2004, pp. 46-47).

It is remarkable that the two issues identified by Skalli as ways in which colonial powers would undermine Muslims were present in the speeches of the ministers. The ministers had made comments about the abolition of the veil and the need for women to be more prominent in the public sphere. So for example, there were calls by numerous ministers for Muslim women to remove their veils. The strongest proponent of this was Harriet Harman, who said:

I want women to be fully included. If you want equality, you have to be in society, not hidden away from it. … [I am concerned about] the young women whose mothers fought against the veil, and who now see their daughters taking it up as a symbol of their fervent commitment to their religion. … [The veil] is about radicalisation and solidarity with community. But I don’t want people to show solidarity by [wearing] something that prevents them taking their full role as women in society. …
The veil is an obstacle to women's participation, on equal terms, in society (Harman, 2006).

What is implied by Harman, as well as by Jack Straw when he said that he tells ladies with veils on “that this is a country built on freedoms” (Straw, 2006a), is that women who wear veils are being forced to wear them, reiterating the stereotype that Muslim women are oppressed. This could also be witnessed when Straw claimed that “most I ask [to remove the veil] seem relieved I have done so. Last Friday was a case in point. The veil came off almost as soon as I opened my mouth” and also when he said that he encountered “some surprises” when he discovered “that the husband had played no part in her decision [to wear the veil]” (Straw, 2006a). The ministers not only encouraged a removal of some aspect of clothing that some Muslims hold precious, but also demanded that Muslim women join the workforce in greater numbers. Jacques Waardenburg has a different take on the plight of Muslim women in Britain today:

An increasing number of Muslim women [in Britain] are now working with paid jobs outside the home. …Muslim women associations, parallel to the existing Muslim men associations, attract members. Women are now playing a greater role in the public domain, also in representative functions for Muslim communities (Waardenburg, 2003, p. 318).

Despite this observation, the stereotype of Muslim women being prevented from working is still present in the ministers’ speeches as it was often claimed that more engagement with Muslim women and their general liberation into the public domain is necessary. For example, when addressing a Muslim audience, John Reid said, “I am glad to see that there are so many women here to engage in this discussion today” (Reid, 2006a). Elsewhere, Hazel Blears said:

I believe that Muslim women should, and will, play an increasingly important role in their communities. At the end of this month a report will be published that will outline a strategy for increasing engagement with Muslim women across the country. This type of engagement is the key to further improving understanding with Muslim communities (Blears, 2006).

It is worth noting how Blears suggests that Muslim women are part of the solution to extremism. This was also apparent in other speeches, such as when Tony Blair said “the extremism we face is usually from men not women” (Blair, 2006d). This ‘privileging’ of Muslim women has been theorised by Nada Elia (2006), the co-founder of the Radical Arab Women's Activist Network (RAWAN), who has argued that Muslim women in ‘the West’ are viewed in a more favourable light than Muslim men because Muslim women are not seen as a threat like Muslim men are, but rather as redeemable and helpful in the desire to modernise Islam. Concern for women’s’ rights is usually a good
thing, but in these cases, it appears as though the ministers were drawing upon stereotypes of Muslim women as passive, and of Muslim men as repressive. They failed to recognise that Muslim men and Muslim women don't always conform to these stereotypes and also that there are non-Muslim women who suffer significant sexism at the hands of non-Muslim men.

‘For too long we overvalued what makes us different’

Throughout the ministers’ speeches there were contradictory statements that made it difficult to decipher what they were trying to convey. On the one hand ministers often made positive, liberal and welcoming statements, but then went on to undermine these very statements through providing other statements with a much more sinister undertone. Various examples throughout have shown this operated, but in their discussion of multiculturalism and diversity it was particularly clear to see contradictory message. So on the one hand, the ministers sometimes celebrated multiculturalism and diversity for making Britain what it is today, but on the other hand, they were also critical of it for preventing ‘community cohesion’. So while there were positive messages that many may relate to such as by Hazel Blears who said: “I believe that Britain is an exemplar of how a multi–faith, multi–ethnic nation can work in practice. …Britain remains a fair, tolerant country, where communities respect one another and people live in peace” (Blears, 2007a), there were also more depressing messages from the likes of Gordon Brown who said: “[P]eople yearn for a Britain of stronger, safer and more cohesive communities …for too long we overvalued what makes us different, it is time to also value what we believe in common a shared national purpose for our country” (Brown, 2006c). Multiculturalism was celebrated but also attacked in the speeches, and the ministers seemed unclear about whether it had been successful or detrimental. Tony Blair’s comments reveal the confusion and discomfort that appeared in relation to multiculturalism:

I never know, although I use the term myself occasionally, quite what people mean when they talk about multiculturalism. If they mean people living in their separate cultures and never integrating at any point together, I think that’s actually certainly not what I mean by the word and I don’t think it’s what most people would regard as sensible (Blair, 2005b).

So the ministers on the one hand praised multiculturalism and claimed Britain was a successfully functioning multicultural society, and then on the other hand criticised it for ‘emphasising difference’. The ministers seemed to reconcile their position by talking of celebrating diversity in the same breath as calling for the need to promote ‘core British values’. Thus, there were several examples of the same minister claiming in one instance that “[p]eople must
be free to choose how to lead their lives, what religion to follow, and so on” (Blunkett, 2002b) but elsewhere saying “[w]e have norms of acceptability and those who come into our home – for that is what it is – should accept those norms just as we would have to do if we went elsewhere” (Blunkett, 2001). Similarly, Blair said on one occasion that “Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about” (Blair, 2006d), but elsewhere said people who “come [to Britain must] play by our rules and our way of life. If they don’t then they are going to have to go” (Blair, 2005b). The mixed messages about whether multiculturalism works, whether minorities are entitled to participate in their own cultures and what integration really means leaves much unanswered. Some prominent commentators argue that what is really sought from Muslims when ‘integration’ is talked about is ‘assimilation under the guise of multiculturalism’, since the Labour Government – which championed multiculturalism when they first came into power in 1997 – later retreated from multiculturalism and expected minorities to conform to ‘Britishness’ (Bradley, 2007, p. 7; Holohan, 2006; Kundnani, 2007, pp. 6-7, 123; Mason, 2000, p. 2; Modood, 2003, p. 13; Modood, 2007, pp. 47-48). Assimilation is further understood to be the desire of the ministers, since the speeches place overwhelming emphasis on the ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ for Muslims to do the work of achieving ‘community cohesion’ by such things as learning about British history, engaging in British culture, learning English, contributing to society and developing a sense of belonging without any mention of what ‘indigenous Britons’ must to do accommodate minorities. This was also evident in the way immigrants were told that there are not only rights that go along with being British, but also responsibilities. These concerns were often specifically targeted towards Muslims since, to bring us full circle back to the first section, it was Muslims who were singled out for attention with regards to discussions about the shortcomings of multiculturalism and the need for integration. For instance, Blair expressed concerned about “how we make sure that the Muslim community integrates with British society” (Blair, 2006c) and elsewhere Kelly said “we underline [Muslims’] responsibility to integrate and contribute to the local community” (Kelly, 2006b). Throughout all of the speeches then, there were very few instances where any ‘duty to accommodate’ was mentioned, but there was a significant amount of emphasis on the ‘duty to integrate’ for Muslims. This is despite integration supposedly being a two-way process whereby both the minorities and the majority in society make efforts to understand one another and make the necessary compromises (Choudhury, 2005, p. 48; Malik, 2004c, p. 11; Modood, 2007, p. 48; Waardenburg, 2003, p. 371).
Conclusion

This article has investigated the representations of Islam and Muslims by Labour Cabinet ministers between 2001 and 2007. Writing in 2000 when the Labour government was still in its relatively early years, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote:

In the latter half of the 1990s there are some optimistic indications that we are getting at least the domestic leadership we deserve. Gordon Brown is only one of the voices making the kind of statement the nation needs to hear, frequently and passionately, from all our leaders. It is important to note that between 1997 and 1998, three British Prime Ministers, three leaders of opposition parties, the Queen and Prince Charles, all made speeches which rejoiced in multicultural Britain... The language used by key figures is at last moving on... (2000, pp. 116-117).

In this passage, Alibhai-Brown, a long time anti-racist activist, reflects the hope that existed at the dawn of the new millennium that with New Labour in particular, we were embarking on a period when racism would be eradicated and diversity would be embraced since it appeared to be such a key feature of the New Labour project in the early years. Following the 2001 summer riots in the Northern mill towns and 9/11, the Labour government’s approach seemed to drastically shift towards a much more intolerant one. Derek McGhee has argued in The End of Multiculturalism? that the Labour government have been complicit in demonising and targeting Muslims in Britain ever since 2001, specifically as part of the ‘War on Terror’. The analysis conducted of the Cabinet ministers’ speeches in this research would concur that the ministers often perpetuated Islamophobic rhetoric about Islam and Muslims. It’s been more than 5 years since the Labour government left office and the hindsight now available offers a disturbing recollection of the Islamophobic rhetoric these ministers were involved in. While at the time it would be unusual to hear this claim being made vocally, with the benefit of historical perspective, it is clear that New Labour’s relationship with Islam and Muslims was problematic. That raises questions about whether current mainstream political actors also have a similarly problematic relationship with Islam and Muslims, even if it is not initially apparent.

The ministers often spoke about Muslims rather than to them, reflecting a tendency to treat Muslims as outsiders rather than as respectable citizens. Muslims were often portrayed as trouble-makers who required special attention because of their inadequacies. Although the ministers often spoke about Al Qaeda and extremists as the problem-makers, the generalised discussion of Muslims often implicated the broader Muslim community as just as dangerous as the very small extreme minority. More specifically, I have
shown in this paper that Muslims were often treated monolithically, that the ministers took it upon themselves to dictate to Muslims which Islamic beliefs they should believe in, that Islam was presented as opposed to Britishness, that Muslims were insinuated to be alien, that Muslims were perceived as a threat to British values and British security (especially young Muslim men), and that Muslims were implied to be sexist. Overall, the ministers painted a picture of a multiculturalism which has failed by and large because of Muslims choosing to live separate lives. Their proposed solution was for Muslims to ‘integrate’ which appeared to mean ‘assimilate’ as no discussion was made of how to accommodate Muslims, but much was made of the need for Muslims to make drastic changes.

It was apparent from the 111 speeches that the ministers were often adhering to a ‘Party line’, meaning that they were not speaking as individuals but had been briefed centrally with what to say. That was evident because so many of the statements were almost identically even when made by different ministers in different events. The ministers therefore echoed each other and it remains unclear who orchestrated the messages and whether any of the ministers were aware that they were involved in generating Islamophobic generalisations, stereotypes and misrepresentations. In summary, according to the interpretation of the speeches in this analysis, Islamophobia based on assumptions, stereotypes and inferences were identified as being commonly occurring in the Labour ministers’ speeches in a variety of ways. The seminal report by The Runnymede Trust that introduced the severity of Islamophobia in Britain explained that “[t]he UK Government’s official stance [towards Muslims] is one of welcome and inclusion. …It is a fine aspiration. The reality, however, frequently falls short” (1997, p. 1). This research endorses this statement, as this paper has demonstrated that Islamophobia frequently appeared in the ministers’ statements. Since negative representations of Muslims and Islam can lead to Muslims experiencing unacceptable prejudice and discrimination in their everyday lives, especially when undertaken by some of the most respect members of society’s elite, these Islamophobic representations must be challenged by pointing out the inconsistencies, misconceptions and contradictions that are contained within them.
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